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ABSTRACT
The ambition of this paper is to contribute to the growing literature of understanding 
potentials and challenges of citizens’ involvement in state financial planning, i.e. 
participatory budgeting (PB). The paper traces the development and underlying 
nature of PB experiments in a comparative perspective: we explore whether and how 
PB experiments form Participatory Governance (PG) in two Northern municipalities 
of Russia, one in the High North and the other outside the Barents region. 
Theoretically, we combine previous knowledge on the role of PB in the PG discourse 
with ideas of neo-institutional theory capturing external pressures and internal 
dynamics of PB. The findings show that both PB cases formed limited PG practices. 
Interestingly, despite the comprehensive rhetoric of “local voice” in the case of the 
High North municipality, there was much less potential for PG in practice than in the 
middle-sized municipality outside the Barents Region with less rhetoric. We propose 
that the combination of various institutional aspects influenced the potentials of PB 
to form PG – and that even though PB in the High North was supposed to involve 
the local inhabitants, it was rather designed and adopted by mimetic and coercive 
pressures. As a result, decisions continued to be kept far away from the “local” High 
North and its internal dynamics. Another PB case, less strategically important than 
the municipality in the High North, was mainly designed and developed through a 
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combination of normative pressures and internal managerial logic. Our paper thus 
shows the significance of existing institutional relations (external pressures and 
internal dynamics) between the central and local authorities in the formation of 
participatory mechanisms such as PB.
Keywords: participatory budgeting, Participatory Governance, Russia, municipality, 
High North 
INTRODUCTION
There is increasing acknowledgement of citizens’ involvement in state governance 
under the banner of Participatory Governance (PG) and New Public Governance 
in general. Based on idea(l)s of deliberative and direct democracy, PG implies 
the formation of various mechanisms of broader stakeholder participation and 
engagement in decision-making on regional and city governance, including strategic, 
urban, and financial planning (see e.g. Fung 2006, 2015; Grossi and Steccolini 2014; 
Klijn, 2012). Nevertheless, while the topic of PG and its fostering mechanisms 
has attracted a considerable body of research related to its effects and challenges 
(for an overview, see Aleksandrov and Timoshenko 2018; Allegretti and Herzberg 
2004; Célérier and Cuenca Botey 2015; Ganuza and Baiocchi 2012; Goldfrank 
2012; Kuruppu et al. 2016; Pinnington et al. 2009), the empirical research on the 
underlying nature of PG initiatives is still limited, especially when it comes to the 
specific contexts and nature of relations between central and local incentives for 
PG mechanisms within one country (Bartocci et al. 2018; Sintomer et al. 2016; van 
Helden and Uddin 2016). Such research is vital given the increasing demands for 
ensuring sustainable societal development, while acknowledging possible tensions 
between local and central interests (Bourmistrov et al. 2017).
In this regard, we aim to trace the development and underlying nature of the 
so-called participatory budgeting (PB3) technique, which has become one of the 
central PG mechanisms/tools across town halls, city administrations, and local 
governments during the last decade (Fung, 2015). Despite various definitions and 
possible characteristics (see Sintomer et al. 2008; Sintomer et al. 2016), PB can be 
defined concisely as a budgeting technique where unelected citizens are allowed 
to participate in public finance allocation and contribute to the decision-making 
process of the public budget. Through a comparative perspective, we explore whether 
and how PB experiments form PG in two Northern municipalities of Russia: one in 
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the High North (the large Murmansk municipality) and the other outside the Barents 
Region (a medium-sized municipality in Leningrad region).
The Russian setting represents a critical case for analysing the underlying nature 
and formation of PB. This is due to radical steps toward experimentation with PG 
mechanisms on the local level in recent years. PB experiments4 were launched almost 
simultaneously by several municipalities in 2013 to test new democratic instruments 
of citizen involvement and their effects on governance (Beuermann and Amelina 
2014; Shulga et al. 2017). The Russian setting is particularly interesting in terms 
of existing centralized and hierarchical governance mechanisms (Khodachek and 
Timoshenko 2018; Zherebtsov 2014), which potentially influence how new PG tools 
are implemented. While an in-depth examination of PB has already revealed pitfalls in 
the North West of Russia (Aleksandrov et al. 2018; Aleksandrov & Timoshenko 2018), 
more general institutional aspects related to PB implementation and relations between 
central and local authorities are still unresearched.  A comparative perspective is 
therefore valuable in order to capture possible practice-based variations and tensions. 
While the two selected cases have similar governance structures and rhetorics 
concerning the development of PG initiatives, their underlying nature may still be 
different. The particularly engaging case of PG is in the High North region with high 
resource potential (e.g. oil, gas, fisheries): it has traditionally been seen as an area 
of global discourses and institutions which pursue the macro interests of influential 
state and non-state actors (Sinha and Bekkevold 2017; Tamnes and Offerdal 2014). 
High North governance is increasingly addressed from the local perspective with 
the promise of considering the values/interests of the population (e.g. Sinha and 
Bekkevold 2017; Torfing and Triantafillou 2016). Such an agenda becomes especially 
relevant under conditions of steady economic growth for the industries in the High 
North and at the same time depopulation among young people (BIN 2018).
Drawing on documentary analysis, video material, social network data, and 
semi-structured interviews, the theoretical basis of this paper is a combination of 
previous knowledge on the role of PB in the PG discourse and the formation of 
its three dimensions (Fung 2006; Fung and Wright 2003; Klijn 2012) with ideas 
of neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; 
Thornton et al. 2012). Such a combination allows for the capture of variations in PB 
practice and social aspects related to its underlying reasons and rationality in the 
context of relationships between central authorities and local governments (Mauro 
et al. 2018). In this regard, our theoretical ambition is to contribute to the literature 
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in several ways. Firstly, by showing potential institutional challenges connected to 
the underlying nature of PB and its development for fruitful PG within a scope of 
relations between central and local incentives, the paper contributes to the growing 
discussion of PG mechanisms in various countries in general and the High North in 
particular (Fung 2015; Sinha and Bekkevold 2017; Torfing and Triantafillou 2016). 
Secondly, with its comparative perspective and Russian context, the paper responds 
to recent calls for comparisons of PB practices within countries and for widening the 
scope of institutional contexts to include emerging economies (Sintomer et al. 2016; 
van Helden and Uddin 2016).
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: the next section introduces the 
PB literature and its role in PG and presents insights from neo-institutional theory 
to guide our comparison. The third section is devoted to some research settings and 
methodological considerations. Further, empirical findings of PB experiments are 
presented as a comparison. The last section contains the discussion and conclusion.
PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING AS A TOOL FOR PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 
FROM THE NEO-INSTITUTIONAL THEORY PERSPECTIVE: EXTERNAL PRESSURES 
AND INTERNAL DYNAMICS 
Participatory Governance (Fung 2006, 2015; Fung and Wright 2003) is closely 
related to so-called Democratic Governance or Public Governance agendas (Grossi 
and Steccolini 2014; Klijn 2012; Osborne 2010). Although different aspects might 
be emphasized, the key principles of the PG agenda can be formulated within 
three main dimensions: democratic legitimacy, effective governance, and social 
justice (Fung 2006, 2015). The democratic legitimacy dimension supposes that 
through participatory practices citizens will start to trust local authorities’ actions 
and decisions as a result of co-production (Fung 2015). The effective governance 
dimension suggests that through participation citizens can be active contributors 
to complex problem solving in government by introducing local knowledge (Lovan 
et al. 2017). And the social justice dimension supposes that participation enables 
divergent/plural voices to be heard without consideration of people’s current social 
status and wealth (Fung and Wright 2003).
While there is a variety of mechanisms/tools of PG formation (see e.g. Klijn 2012 
for a review), one of the best-known approaches is related to citizens’ participation 
in the budgeting process, i.e. PB. Appearing first in Brazil in 1989, PB became a 
“symbol of democracy” and a successful model of participation around the world 
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(Sintomer et al. 2008), today found in more than 1500 cities in different continents 
(Ganuza and Baiocchi 2012). PB develops in space and time, and the practices vary 
(Sintomer et al. 2016). In general, the process starts with citizens identifying local 
needs, generating ideas to respond to those needs, and deliberating on the ideas. 
Based on the deliberations, citizens develop selected ideas into specific projects that 
address the needs, in collaboration with public officials. Next, residents vote for or 
negotiate which of these projects to fund and put in the budget (Pinnington et al. 
2009). In Europe, PB has become a highly popular process (Sintomer et al. 2008) 
with, for example, the UK, Germany, Italy, France, and Spain initiating PB practices 
countrywide (Allegretti and Herzberg 2004). More recently, less developed and 
developing countries have also started to follow suit (e.g. Aleksandrov et al. 2018; 
Kuruppu et al. 2016; Uddin et al. 2011).
As it travels around the world, the PB technique is deeply rooted in the three above-
mentioned dimensions of PG (Goldfrank, 2012; Pinnington et al., 2009; Sintomer et 
al., 2008; Sintomer et al., 2016). These scholars discussed broadly these dimensions of 
PG and their formation through PB by testing them on different countries’ settings. 
Some scholars have shown that PB is able to form all three dimensions of PG, thus 
becoming a valuable mechanism to ensuring sustainable development in the public 
sector (e.g. Abers 2001; Allegretti and Herzberg 2004), but an increasing number of 
critical studies paint a less optimistic picture with various pitfalls of PB in forming 
PG. For example, PB can be a “shield”, “show”, and “ritual” without real citizen 
participation (e.g. Davidson and Elstub 2014; Uddin et al. 2011). Others show that PB 
can be exploited for others’ political and economic interests (e.g. Célérier and Cuenca 
Botey 2015; Harun et al. 2015; Kuruppu et al. 2016) or just developed through the 
“old way of thinking”, which is rather administratively oriented (He 2011), perhaps 
leading to a reflexivity trap (Aleksandrov et al. 2018) or to using elements which are 
not coherent with democratic ideals of PB (Aleksandrov and Timoshenko 2018). 
By promoting external legitimacy instead of democracy, citizen participation may 
end up mixing effectiveness with efficiency, as well as developing symbolic social 
justice with the political elite in place (see Aleksandrov and Timoshenko 2018 
for an overview). Such developments point to the generation of more analytical 
knowledge and the application of novel theories, which can capture the challenges 
and opportunities of the development of PG practices in specific contexts.
While there are many possible theories to apply to study the underlying challenges 
related to PB implementation and the formation of PG (for an overview, see 
Aleksandrov and Timoshenko 2018), we approach the comparative perspective by 
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drawing upon the ideas of institutional theory, as recently called for by van Helden and 
Uddin (2016). Explicitly, we draw on ideas of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983) and institutional logics (Thornton et al. 2012), which stress various 
combinations of external pressures and internal dynamics for the formation of PB and 
therefore its PG dimensions (Bartocci et al. 2018; Mauro et al. 2018).
Institutional isomorphism supposes that organizations adopt similar patterns of 
practices under particular institutional conditions, thus becoming homogenous 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  In other words, rather than being confined to learning 
from their own experience by encoding inferences from history into routines guiding 
their behaviour (Levitt and March 1988), public organizations such as municipalities 
can find it desirable to be legitimized by others or portray themselves as modern 
by meeting requirements in resources and securing their survival (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977). Applied to PB, institutional isomorphism suggests that, in the two 
PB cases under comparison, legitimated structures and procedures of PB can be 
transported to municipalities through three separate external forces/pressures or 
their combinations: coercive, mimetic, and normative (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Coercive mechanisms are exercised via external pressures exerted by the government, 
or regulatory or other agencies (e.g. through limiting funding) to adopt certain 
practices they find appropriate, therefore raising the issue of external legitimacy. 
Mimetic mechanisms are a result of organizational responses to circumstances of 
uncertainty when, in the case of PB, municipalities imitate practices of others for 
institutional survival under uncertainty. Normative mechanisms emphasize the 
effect of the professions and rational thinking in the adoption of PB (e.g. through the 
influence of consultants), along with education.
While institutional isomorphism is valuable in capturing external forces/pressures 
related to PB and its formation of PG, it is still unsuitable for revealing possible 
internal dynamics in PB design and implementation. In this regard, as proposed by 
Bartocci et al. (2018), ideas of institutional logics can be useful to interpret internal 
actors’ motivations and processes related to the adoption of PG mechanisms (p. 4). 
Institutional logics “represent frames of reference that condition actors’ choices for 
sense-making, the vocabulary they use to motivate action, and their sense of self 
and identity” (Thornton et al. 2012, 2). Applying to PG in particular, multiple logics 
can create “practice diversity” or internal dynamics by enabling variety in cognitive 
orientation and contestation over which practices are appropriate (Lounsbury 2008). 
According to Bartocci et al. (2018), PB design and implementation can be linked 
to three distinctive underlying logics and their combinations: political, managerial, 
71
and community building. These can in turn be identified with a specific focus on 
the internal actors (who?), motivations (why?), and processes (how?) in relation to 
PB (Bartocci et al. 2018). Political logic supposes that the internal dynamics of PB 
involve politicians (who) and political rationalities in reinventing local democracy 
(why) where PB is conceived as a highly symbolic tool detached from annual 
financial planning (how) (Sintomer et al. 2008). Managerial logics involve PB 
promotion by managers (who) with the idea of improving the public performance of 
administrations (why), where PB is organized as a more rational process integrated 
with existing budgeting tools (how) (He 2011). A community building logic 
supposes that PB is internally constructed by civil society organizations like NGOs or 
community associations (who) (Sintomer et al. 2008) with the goal of strengthening 
citizens’ sense of belonging to the local community and sociability (why). Based 
on this logic, PB is organized as management of funds or specific projects in social, 
environmental, and cultural areas with no explicit reference to the municipal budget 
(Bartocci et al. 2018; He 2011; Sintomer et al. 2008).
Therefore, combining ideas of institutional isomorphism with an institutional logics 
approach, we ask how the formation of PG by PB can be explained as a social process 
with a combination of external pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and internal 
dynamics (Bartocci et al. 2018). In this regard, the paper examines and reports 
the main interpretations of external rationalities for PB (coercive, mimetic, and 
normative), internal dynamics (“who”, “why” and “how”, which form particular logics 
or their combinations), and PB effects within PG dimensions (democratic legitimacy, 
effective governance, and social justice). While we acknowledge the possible critique 
of the institutional approach in studying challenges of PB (especially internal ones, 
see Aleksandrov et al. (2018)), we rather stress that it is analytically valuable for 
studying the more general organizational level of PB development in the scope of 
relations between central government institutions and local governments (Klimanov 
and Mikhaillova 2011).
RESEARCH SETTING AND METHOD
Based on the research question and theoretical considerations, this study is 
qualitative and applies a comparative case-study strategy. The first case represents 
the PB practice in the municipality X, which attracted attention for the PG rhetoric 
among local and regional mass media with such headings as “Citizens have looked 
into the state pocket”. Municipality X is a city with a population of around 70,000 
people, located in North-West Russia (Leningrad region). The municipal budget 
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was around three billion roubles in 2013. More than 500 large, medium, and small 
companies operate in the municipality, with different business areas and forms 
of ownership, including the use of advanced technology. Major industries are 
manufacturing, construction, science, transport, and communications. There are 
around 29 educational institutions.
The second case represents PB practice in the municipality of Murmansk (Barents 
region) with a “3D Budget”. The name comes from three Russian words beginning 
with the letter “D”, literally translated as “let’s divide the money”. Murmansk, with a 
population of around 300,000, is located within the Arctic Circle and has strategic 
significance in the development of resources and economic growth in the Arctic 
as the largest port on the shores of the Arctic. All large enterprises are connected 
with fisheries and fish processing, ship repair, sea transport, metal working, rail and 
automobile transportation, the food industry, and sea geology. Murmansk has around 
227 educational institutions. The municipal budget was ten billion roubles in 2013.
There are thus some differences between these two municipalities in terms of 
geographical position, size, economy, and finance, but both municipalities’ budgeting 
practices are regulated by a set of similar norms on the federal level.5 Thus, we expect 
these two cases to be suitable to compare. As the main data sources, we draw on 
documentary analysis, video material, social network data, and semi-structured 
interviews. Most of the data were collected and analysed during 2013–2014. All data 
were collected in the Russian language with subsequent translation into English.
To understand the context and preconditions of PB, we accessed a variety of written 
material (scientific literature and newspaper articles) and official documents (budget 
and tax law books, documents of, for example, the Ministry of Regional Development, 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development Ministry) as well as internal 
documentation and texts suggested by the interviewees. In our two cases, texts and 
other data from official websites (municipalities) were also taken into consideration. 
In both cases, we analysed some official documents regarding PB, local newspaper 
articles and interviews with PB participants which were available online.
In the case of municipality X, we collected videotape data of internal PB processes 
(meetings of PB participants) and social network data. This was possible thanks to 
a special online group created in the social networking service vk.com 6. It enabled 
the exchange and communication of information in relation to the PB project.  In 
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total, the Internet portal had around 160 participants for 2014 and open access. The 
Internet portal contains video material of the PB process, such as PB participants’ 
meetings and presentations from April 2013 to May 2014. In total, we analysed 
around 32 hours of video material. Social network data for analysis included online 
discussion texts/lines and texts/lines of comments related to PB processes published 
in an online group of vk.com. In the case of Murmansk municipality, we tracked the 
forum discussions and comments of citizens on the official website and vk.com social 
network of the city administration in relation to PB.
In addition to documentary analysis, videotape, and social network data, we 
conducted two semi-structured interviews, one with the PB coordinator of 
municipality X in May 2014 and the other with the head of the Murmansk municipal 
finance committee in August 2014. Each interview lasted about 60 minutes (only one 
was tape-recorded). The interview guide was structured by a number of questions on 
several sub-topics: general idea, reasons/rationality for PB experimentation, guiding 
principles of the process along with its challenges, and general results. The interviews 
were transcribed, and a summary was sent to interviewees for additional feedback.
The data analysis was primarily guided by our theoretical framework based on 
ideas of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), institutional logics 
(Bartocci et al. 2018), and PG (Fung 2006, 2015; Fung and Wright 2003). Therefore, 
we highlighted and coded interview transcripts, documents, and notes according to 
the fields of our study interests, i.e. external pressures for PB, internal dynamics, and 
PB effects within PG dimensions. Below, we present key findings in this regard.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: PB FORMATION OF PG AS A SOCIAL PROCESS OF 
EXTERNAL PRESSURES AND INTERNAL DYNAMICS
External pressures for PB
The collected data shows that both cases report several combinations of external 
rationalities for the introduction of PB (Table 1).
Both cases reported similar mimetic pressures evident in general reference to PB 
and other experiments as a possible way to involve local citizens in local financial 
planning and in this way to gain legitimacy in the eyes of central authorities by 
exercising the transparency law. Social network data and documents reported that in 
both cases the initiative for PB was linked to the current Russian federal legislation 
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calling for transparency and the openness of financial information, namely FZ №8 
2009, “On providing access to information about the activities of state bodies and 
local self-government”. The idea of this law is that municipalities should be more 
transparent and open to their citizens regarding financial information. Thus, in both 
cases, we can argue that PB has become a good way to respond to current legislation 
by imitating others’ experiences of PB. Specifically, it is evident in both cases that 
several municipalities’ documents in relation to PB refer to the transparency law and 
to the classical PB experiences of Brazil (Sintomer et al. 2008).
Along with the similarities, the external rationalities for PB were somewhat more 
nuanced in both cases in terms of normative and coercive pressures. Specifically, the 
case of the medium-sized municipality of Leningrad Region showed the core element 
of normative pressure in PB. This was evident in the form of external research group 
intervention for PB experimentation. As a part of the research centre at one of the 
prestigious private universities in Russia and in receipt of financial support from 
a powerful non-commercial foundation, the research group became an important 
external initiator and further advisor for PB in municipality X. As the documents 
and the interview highlighted, the nature of the PB experiment was to test whether 
PB and Western democratic ideas were applicable to Russian practices. Referring 
to the work of Sintomer et al. (2008), the World Bank report on the Brazilian 
case, the external research group developed the methodological guidelines for PB 
implementation in Russian settings, based on rather rational and practical thinking 
Table 1: Summary of external  
pressures in two municipalities
PRESSURES
Coercive
Mimetic
Normative
MEDIUM-SIZED MUNICIPALITY 
IN LENINGRAD REGION
(municipality x)
The transparency law
International experiences of PB
Intervention of research group
LARGE MUNICIPALITY OF 
MURMANSK
Funds and strategy dependence
 
The transparency law
International experiences of PB
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(e.g. evidence of preliminary observations by the research group in the municipality 
and awareness of bureaucratic procedures in the municipality; for more detail see 
Shulga et al. (2017)).
In the Murmansk case, while there was no evidence of normative pressures in 
relation to PB, coercive pressures appeared to be crucial for PB initiation. Specifically, 
compared to municipality X, the documents highlighted that most of the budget 
funds for the development of Murmansk were handled as subsidiaries from federal 
and regional governments. This in turn dictated the main conditions and priority 
areas of budget policy spending for Murmansk as a key strategic city under the 
agenda of Arctic governance, security, and the development of sea routes. In this 
regard, the Murmansk case was a little more nuanced in terms of searching for extra 
legitimacy from the central authorities in relation to funds and at the same time 
following the priorities set for the development of Murmansk region according 
to transparency and the involvement of local inhabitants in governance. This 
problematic concern was also evident in an interview with the head of the finance 
committee who stressed that he was “following both local dimensions and central 
strategic priorities in governance”.
Internal dynamics of PB
As suggested by the literature, along with external pressures for PB, the internal 
dynamics can be reflected by particular institutional logics of PB and their 
combinations (Bartocci et al. 2018). Based on data collected, we found several 
distinctive combinations of logics in both cases (Table 2).
In the case of municipality X, the internal dynamics of PB was formed within a 
combination of managerial and community building logics. Specifically, with regard 
to the main internal rationality for PB, the head of the administration and budget 
committee department played a central role in the decision to adopt PB by working 
with the research group to “internalize” PB guidelines for municipality routines. 
The documentary analysis, videotapes, and social network data also highlighted the 
involvement of NGOs and activist groups – in addition to public managers  – in 
PB development in the municipality as active participation in the PB process. In 
this way, the data demonstrated a combination of several internal justifications 
for PB, including conceiving citizens’ involvement as a rational tool of solving 
the “legitimacy gap” between local administration and citizens and therefore of 
increasing the effectiveness of local budget formation and further empowering local 
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communities in city management. Such a combination of actors and motivations led 
to the design of the PB initiative jointly by the administration and research group 
while civil organizations dominated the PB process itself.
The PB process was organized in a rational form of mini-public participation where 
15 citizen-participants and 15 “backup” citizens (in case participants from the main 
group withdrew) were randomly selected into a PB commission to decide how to 
spend around 1.5% of the municipal budget. For that purpose, the PB commission 
Table 2. Summary of underlying  
logics of PB in two municipalities
CASES
Medium-sized 
municipality in 
Leningrad region 
(municipality X)
Large municipality 
of Murmansk
POLITICAL 
LOGIC
Who: Mayor
Why: Citizens’  
empowerment for 
democracy
How: Broad-based  
participation with 
high symbolism,  
comparatively large 
amount of budget 
funds (approx. 10%), 
only voting for budget 
directions 
MANAGERIAL 
LOGIC
Who: Public managers
Why: Search for ra-
tional problem-solving 
of “legitimacy gap” and 
effectiveness
How: Mini-group parti-
cipation, micro-projects, 
limited budget funds 
(approx. 1.5%), budget 
lectures, meetings, discus-
sions and voting
Who: Public managers
Why: Effective 
governance
How: Use of  
questionnaires,  
mass media, online  
feedback form    
COMMUNITY  
BUILDING LOGIC
Who: NGOs and activists 
Why: Sense of belonging  
to the city
How: Thematic  
dominance of civil  
organizations’ agenda
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operated during May and June in meetings moderated by a member of the research 
group. During those meetings, the citizen-participants exchanged and deliberated 
project ideas for budget applications, and discussed them with administrative 
departments. Educational aspects were also evident in the form of open lectures 
on the municipal budget process, governance structure, and urban management 
organized by the administration and the research group. The meetings were followed 
by final discussions and voting for particular project ideas among the commission 
members and subsequent implementation within the municipal budget. As the 
video and social network data demonstrated, within such a design, the PB process 
was dominated by mini-projects with thematic dominance of the agenda of civil 
organizations, including environmental issues (e.g. budget spending for local battery 
recycling), capital budgeting in sport (e.g. construction of cycling paths), or common 
urban space construction (e.g. multifunctional park areas).
Both municipalities wielded a sort of PR campaign before experimenting with 
PB, but the Murmansk municipality clearly chose a more prominent rhetoric in 
conjunction with its PB initiative; it also encouraged local citizens to participate in 
the upcoming initiative with such slogans as “You decide how to slice (= distribute) 
the budget”.
In the case of Murmansk, the internal PB dynamics was different, revealing a 
combination of political and managerial logics in place. With regard to the main 
internal actors, PB was initiated by the mayor with the support of the head of 
administration and the council of deputies. The public council of the city served as a 
communication channel, and the mass media provided a PR company. Further, the 
documentary analysis and interview demonstrated a combination of several internal 
justifications for PB, including citizens’ empowerment to increase democracy and 
effective governance. Specifically, the head of the finance committee reflected that 
PB was intended as “…a form of work with the population which allows the opinion 
of citizens to be considered at the discussion of distribution of the budgetary funds” 
along with making it possible to “…identify the most significant social problems 
from the standpoint of Murmansk citizens”.
The PB process in Murmansk was organized in a combination of rational 
administrative thinking and large-scale rhetoric on citizen participation as a symbol of 
direct democracy. Specifically, according to available accounts, it was expected that all 
citizens of Murmansk would decide how to spend 10% of the municipal budget in two 
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stages: an extensive questionnaire (September 2013) and a public event (4 November 
2013). The questionnaire could be filled in on paper or online and was designed with 
two subsequent parts. Firstly, citizens were asked what expenditures they considered 
as priorities for the city of Murmansk in 2014 (for example education, health, sport, 
or social housing). Secondly, people were asked whether they supported the social 
projects of the administration. The public event was organized on the central square 
of the city with the so-called “slicing [or sawing] the budget” approach: the organizers 
prepared a beam there that symbolized the budget of the city. The beam was divided 
into nine parts (the same ones as in the questionnaire, e.g. education, health, etc.) with 
12,500 small holes and 12,500 sticks prepared for voting. Every citizen could get one 
stick to put it in a specific hole. A few hours later, the beam looked like a big hedgehog. 
Then the beam was sawn into nine pieces of different length.
PB effects within PG dimensions
As suggested by our theoretical frame of reference, specific external rationalities and 
internal dynamics of PB can lead to the formation of PG in general (Bartocci et al. 
2018; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; He 2011) and its three dimensions in particular 
(Fung 2006, 2015; Fung and Wright 2003). Based on the collected data, this paper 
reports several distinctive potentials of PG formation in this regard (Table 3).
In municipality X, several potentials for PG formation were evident. Within the 
democratic legitimacy dimension of PG, the collected data demonstrated that 
PB had become a valuable tool in citizens’ learning about local government and 
the budgetary process, as evidenced by more sophisticated questions and issues 
raised by PB participants with the administration. As the videotape observations 
demonstrated, by understanding the budget process, the participants started to 
understand and discuss project ideas with officials rather than only blaming them. 
Therefore, it can be argued that PB has led to the formation of citizens’ trust in local 
authorities and has become a good communication channel between citizens and 
local authorities: “… People got used to seeing officials as their enemies, but when 
they work together on something, they change the style of conversation and ideas 
about the work. People begin to offer constructive ideas.” [PB coordinator]
Regarding the formation of the effective governance dimension of PG in municipality 
X, the data sources reported several examples of citizens’ contributing to local 
governance with their knowledge (Lovan et al. 2017). Specifically, the PB commission 
created a number of interesting capital budgeting projects such as a multifunctional 
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Table 3. Summary of PB 
formation of PG dimensions in 
two municipalities
PG DIMENSIONS
Democratic 
legitimacy
Effective 
governance
 
 
 
Social justice
MEDIUM-SIZED MUNICIPALITY 
IN LENINGRAD REGION
(municipality x)
Citizens’ learning, trust formation 
and communication channel
Interesting effective projects
Future officials (experts) from 
citizens
New PB cycle
Limited decisions with few partici-
pants, BUT discussions of munici-
pality governance beyond PB
LARGE MUNICIPALITY OF 
MURMANSK
Negative discussions in local mass 
media, decrease of citizens’ trust
 
Extensive questionnaire data and 
public meeting but these were not 
used further
No plan to repeat PB again
“No comments” for citizens’ 
budget decision to be taken into 
consideration
playground or cycling area in the city centre. As the PB coordinator reflected, such 
projects are usually marginalized by the administration which is too busy with other 
government responsibilities and the implementation of more standard capital projects. 
In this way, citizen involvement led to a more effective response to the local needs in 
creating the city environment. In addition, as observations and documents revealed, 
the municipality gained new “experts” among the citizens, who applied to be municipal 
council members. Such effective governance results have led to the transformation of 
the PB experiment into established practice in municipality X since 2014.
Last but not least, the PB in municipality X also had implications for the social 
justice dimension of PG to some extent. In particular, the data revealed that, while 
PB produced limited decisions (only 1.5% of the municipal budget) with few 
participants (15 commission members), such a weak form of participation has also 
led to discussions of municipality governance beyond PB. Such observations were 
evident especially on the Internet portal/network, where not only PB commission 
members but, importantly, other citizens discussed project ideas. For example, the 
discussion of a new playground capital project has led to parallel questioning of the 
city administration actions in relation to nearby territories and park reconstruction.
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In Murmansk municipality, potentials for PG formation were hardly evident. As 
the data revealed, the PB initiative instead led to decreased democratic legitimacy 
and unclear effects on effective governance and social justice. Specifically, after 
the public event of “slicing the budget”, the administration gave a very positive 
assessment on the project, as the experiment showed that citizens (about 25,000 
people) were very active and interested in deciding on budget allocations of the 
city. However, there was no disclosure of how big a part of the budget (10%) 
would be formed in accordance with the wishes of the citizens. In this regard, the 
administration maintained a “no comments” position, where the results of the 
questionnaire and public event were kept but not used further. This resulted in 
rather decreased trust of citizens in their local authorities and negative assessments 
in local mass media and internet forums with such headings as: “It is not clear 
if the ‘3D Budget’ project really influenced the budget decisions”, “The experiment is 
obviously not finished”, “The idea is good, but the execution spoiled everything”. Others 
expressed their opinion more strongly: “While we were slicing the beam, they 
[officials] were slicing the real budget”, “The officials used citizens as a mindless 
stage prop”, “The administration showed extreme disrespect for us”, “They reported 
on results and forgot about us”. It seems that the administration was satisfied 
with the intermediate result, that is, establishment of “feedback” with the citizens 
concerning budgeting. Nevertheless, the reflection of the head of the Murmansk 
municipal finance committee was more nuanced on that issue. Accurately, he/she 
reflected on the fact that “even though we have a general idea of such initiatives as 
PB to be adopted through looking at others’ examples, we are too much dependent in 
our actions on federal and regional orders and priorities”. To some extent, the head 
of the Murmansk municipal finance committee agreed with the criticism of the 
citizens that the PB was unfinished and symbolic. However, she/he emphasized the 
general strategic orientation of Murmansk and funds being mostly exploited for 
specific purposes connected to the Arctic development. Indeed, we found several 
strategic documents and programme documents which challenged the possibility 
to consider the results of citizens’ decisions, even to the extent of 10% of the total 
budget. Therefore, as one of the participating citizens reflected in the social media: 
“participation was only for participation”. As a result, there are no plans to repeat 
such an experiment in Murmansk yet.
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EXTERNAL 
PRESSURES
INTERNAL 
DYNAMICS
PARTICIPATORY 
GOVERNANCE
MEDIUM-SIZED 
MUNICIPALITY IN 
LENINGRAD REGION
LARGE MUNICIPALITY 
OF MURMANSK
1. Normative
2. Mimetic
3. Coercive
1. Managerial logic
2. Community-
building logic
Increased democratic legitimacy
Limited effective governance
Limited social justice
Decreased democratic legitimacy
Unclear effective governance
Unclear social justice
1. Coercive
2. Mimetic
1. Political logic
2. Managerial logic
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper responds to the recent calls to study the underlying nature of PG in 
terms of the specific contexts and nature of relations between the central and local 
incentives toward PG mechanisms within one country (Bartocci et al. 2018; Sintomer 
et al. 2016; van Helden and Uddin 2016). In this regard, the paper has traced the 
development and underlying nature of the PB technique as a central mechanism/
tool in forming PG (Fung, 2015). Specifically, we have explored whether and how PB 
experiments formed PG in two Northern municipalities of Russia: one in the High 
North (the large Murmansk municipality) and the other outside the Barents Region 
(a medium-sized municipality in Leningrad region).
The findings show that both PB cases formed limited PG practices based on its three 
main dimensions: democratic legitimacy, effective governance, and social justice 
(Fung 2006, 2015; Fung and Wright 2003; Lovan et al. 2017). Such observations 
concur with previous observations in the literature on the problematic nature of PB 
in the PG discourse (e.g. Aleksandrov et al. 2018; Célérier and Cuenca Botey 2015; 
Harun et al. 2015; He 2011; Kuruppu et al. 2016; Uddin et al. 2011). Nevertheless, 
the internal country comparison perspective brings exciting insights into the nature 
of relations between the central and local incentives toward PG mechanisms. PB 
formation of PG is clearly a social process combining external pressures (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983) and internal dynamics (Bartocci et al. 2018) (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Comparison of PB experiments 
and their formation of PG
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As revealed in the Murmansk case, even though the general content of PB was guided 
by PG intent, the results of citizens’ incentives toward the budget were hidden under 
the general budget-drafting process related to key priorities of the regional and federal 
development of the Arctic. These findings agree with recent claims that strategic and 
financial planning continues to be far removed from the really “local” High North 
(Bourmistrov et al. 2017). Such symbolic actions and ignorance (e.g. Davidson and 
Elstub 2014; Uddin et al. 2011) led to rather decreased democratic legitimacy in 
Murmansk. The same applied to other dimensions of PG in Murmansk, because 
the PB potential of forming effective governance and social justice was blurred. 
In the medium-sized municipality X, even though the PB experiment was much 
smaller in terms of scope and funding, the potential continued to grow with stronger 
engagement by the local inhabitants. Here, the PB experiment was comparable 
with the general content of PB practices (Sintomer et al. 2008; Sintomer et al. 2012; 
Sintomer et al. 2016), adding local flavours such as coordination by the external 
research group and the lecture component. As we discovered, this PB experiment had 
more potentials to form PG but with limited dimensions of effective governance and 
social justice. Such internal challenges of PB have already been revealed by previous 
studies in general (Harun et al. 2015; Lovan et al. 2017; Sintomer et al. 2016) and on 
Russia in particular (Aleksandrov et al. 2018; Aleksandrov and Timoshenko 2018). At 
the same time, the result of the experiment also has some potential in this regard such 
as the creation of future experts among citizens who then become deputies or officials, 
along with discussions of municipality governance beyond PB.
Summing up, even though both municipalities’ initial rhetoric was related to 
forming PG through the introduction of PB, its potentials in practice were entirely 
different. Paradoxically, the medium-sized municipality with less rhetorical and less 
comprehensive PB content in terms of the scope of citizens’ participation and funds 
to be distributed formed a more fruitful PG discourse than the large municipality 
of Murmansk, which had more initial open incentives for citizens’ involvement on a 
more significant scale and with a larger budget.
In order to explain such observations, we propose that particular relations between 
the PB external pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and internal dynamics 
(Bartocci et al. 2018; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977) have 
influenced the potential for PG formation in both cases. Specifically, in the case of 
Murmansk municipality, even though PB in the High North was supposed to involve 
the local inhabitants’ dimension, it was rather designed and adopted by mimetic 
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and mainly coercive pressures, which kept decisions far away from the “local” High 
North. Those pressures were juxtaposed with the external dynamics of PB. These 
are driven by a political and managerial logic, where the intentionality and actions 
related to PB have high PG potential. The other PB case, less strategically important 
than the municipality in the High North, was mainly designed and developed 
through a combination of normative pressures and internal managerial logic.
Therefore, the central argument in our paper is the importance of considering 
the possible relations between external pressures and internal dynamics (Mauro 
et al. 2018) of such PG mechanisms as PB, for this influences the potential of PB 
to form PG in particular contexts. As our paper has shown, the lack of alignment 
between external pressures and internal dynamics can lead to limited PG potential 
of PB. When applied to the High North, paradoxically, the development of PG 
mechanisms is challenging because the High North context offers both opportunities 
and constraints from an institutional point of view. Strong political and managerial 
incentives toward PG cannot guarantee that the practice will succeed. Crucially, the 
High North is a part of global opportunities for resource exploitation. Its strategic 
importance limits the development of participatory practices even though local 
incentives toward such practices have high potential. The High North thus becomes a 
setting where all local initiatives are still much more about global discourses.
With these findings, the paper contributes to the growing literature of potentials 
and challenges of PB as a mechanism for securing sustainable societal development 
in various countries in general and the High North in particular (Aleksandrov et 
al. 2018; Aleksandrov and Timoshenko 2018; Bartocci et al. 2018; Beuermann and 
Amelina 2014; Fung 2015; Sinha and Bekkevold 2017; Torfing and Triantafillou 
2016). Specifically, we contribute to this literature by showing possible tensions 
between external pressures and internal dynamics of PB, which potentially limit 
PG development in terms of relations between central and local governments 
(Bourmistrov et al. 2017). Secondly, by adopting a comparative perspective and 
involving the Russian context, the paper responds to the recent calls for comparison 
of PB practices within countries and for widening the scope of institutional contexts 
to include emerging economies (Sintomer et al. 2016; van Helden and Uddin 2016).
Our study has several limitations. The first limitation is connected with the 
generalization of the findings in relation to Russia as a whole. While we have 
attempted theoretical generalization by presenting a comparison of two cases, we 
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